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"Authoritarianism Kind Of Actually Works"-An 'actual' corporate media meme in USA,
https://id2020.orgLast Edit by Palmerston
Confucianism : Which teaches personal and governmental morality, correctness of social relationships, justice, kindness, and sincerity.Non-Intervention : The complete and utter opposite of Western Imperialism, wars like Iraq, Vietnam etc . . . Trade with other nations, not wage war.
If it was not so serious, it could be considered comedy, check this quote out from ID2020 :The ability to prove who you are is a fundamental and universal human right.They also have shit claiming that BlockChain gives us privacy by recording whosoever we buy or sell, 666.Last Edit by Palmerston
This is no joke and THEY are deadly serious. Are WE going to just go along with all of this?Last Edit by Palmerston
YOU are doing so far!I just spoke to a lesser, 'government' (civil agency) worker, and they, for maybe their own reasons:agreed with a "YES", when I posited to them: "This is going on until september, you know!".("worst-case-scenario") is the lingo, the jargon.I'd want to push the public to the limit, to see when they break.This generation, your generation, the infamously apathetic, oh yes: apathetic; GEN-Z(ero)Last Edit by Palmerston
Confucianism is outlawed in China, it's practiced in Taiwan now.
China is the technocratic 'favored' nation state of the globalists no matter the FAKE 'Oceana' attacks by THEIR media.Last Edit by Palmerston
They just restarted a total surveillance camera system that records the whole city of Baltimore, Maryland. The article below is from 2016. They claim its for crime fighting, but it is no coincidence the timing of restarting of program . This coming to a city near you. They will claim it is to stop the spread of virus and fine/jail people who disobey martial law orders.Since January, police have been testing an aerial surveillance system adapted from the surge in Iraq. And they neglected to tell the public.https://bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-surveillance/
https://washingtonmonthly.com/2020/04/10/the-case-for-universal-mandatory-covid-19-testing/Globalists are pushing for MANDATORY TESTING nationwide in the US, note that this falls under so-called "phase one"The fact that they are doing this, just goes to show that when they get to phase 4, they'll do the same thing with their terrorist bioweapon injections.This FUCKING ILLEGAL as hell, and violates the inalienable rights of man. What, you fucks demand to be tested so you can track me with Palantir with a false positive test now associated with my phone? Do you fucks think we're stupid?This shit violates the hell out of the 4th amendment it isn't even funny. My medical status is NONE of your fucking business, NONE OF IT, PERIOD, EVER.COVID-19: Mandatory Testing, Tracking and VaccinationLast Edit by Palmerston
===============================================Since EVERYONE has coronavirus in their system based off of the 'fact' that there are 'coronaviruses' associated with the common cold, and since coronavirus have been on earth most likely BEFORE dinosaurs roamed the earth, it is easy to predict with certainty that most people would test positive for COVID. The majority of people would have tested positive BEFORE this so-called pandemic was made 'official' after EVENT201.The fact everyone has a coronavirus in them is why, I believe, the coronavirus was the 'go to' virus for the globalists. This 'fact' certainly was behind the controversy of the CDC tests from the beginning. It's also in my opinion why THEY [see EVENT201] had to change the pandemic name to climate chang... err I mean... COVID 19, so to bury the original claim of 'coronavirus'.Of course once everyone is tested to have a virus they had BEFORE this planned-emic was even a thought the medical Nazis will really go into full on fear porn panic mode. "MY GOD!!! WE NEED TRACKING OF EVERYONE!!!!!"Last Edit by Palmerston
1990 Article - Contact Tracing - Social Networks/Adversarial Networks Inaugurated Under The Pretense Of 'We Have To Contain The AIDS Epidemic'BTW - just as a sidenote - if you look at that network schematic inside the article - the white dots represent unaffected persons and the black dots represent HIV-infected people - well, it so happens to be that the early eugenics charts used the EXACT same topological network schemes - a black dot was used to denote a 'feeble-minded' or 'hereditary defect' inside the family tree, and a white dot was used to represent 'eugenically sound' people. I might have to dig up a screenshot from one of the early eugenics periodicals (American Breeders' Magazine/Journal Of Heredity) and post it here so you can see that it is nearly exactly the same.Anyway, here goes. This is an article that appeared in the March 1990 issue of Playboy Magazine.The Case For Contact TracingThe story broke last Thanksgiving. The New York Times declared: "AIDS STUDY WARNS OF WOMEN'S FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY IN 'SAFE' SEX." The Chicago Tribune was more direct: "MAN INFECTS 11 WOMEN WITH AIDS VIRUS."One man living in Belgium had infected 11 women with HIV. The women were for the most part white, middle class and married; they had averaged two and a half sexual partners over a three-year period. The man was neither a drug addict nor a bisexual. Two of the women had caught the AIDS virus after a single encounter.The media had found a heterosexual Typhoid Mary - equivalent to the Patient Zero that Randy Shilts immortalized in And The Band Played On.We checked out the source of the story, a report in The New England Journal of Medicine, and found that for once, the facts were pretty much as stated. But the media had missed the most important part of the story.Heterosexual transmission in the U.S. is rare (about five percent of cases). In Belgium, however, 66 percent of all patients with AIDS have become infected through heterosexual contacts. For the past five years, patients in Brussels and Antwerp (Netherlands) have been offered participation in a pilot program of partner notification (My note: This was before they rolled out Internet access to the public and before the social taboo of 'personal computers being bad' was broken. So they didn't have their social networking sites back then.) Four women who tested HIV-positive named the same man as a possible source of their infection. None was willing to notify him, so the program tracked him down. He turned out to be a civil engineer from central Africa who tested positive for HIV. He could remember the names of 19 sexual partners. He did not want to notify any of them, so again the program acted.When investigators found the other women, all but one agreed to be tested. Seven of them were found to be HIV-positive. That brought the number of female sexual partners of the index patient who tested HIV-positive to 11. Six of these women named a total of eight male sexual partners; all eight agreed to be tested. One of them was HIV-positive, and he named two female sexual partners, who tested negative.The follow-up to these cases constitutes an impressive argument for contact tracing. According to The New England Journal of Medicine:"Two and a half years after the initial counseling and testing, six of the 11 HIV-seropositive women were still attending an HIV clinic. Five of them had engaged in monogamous relationships with partners who used condoms consistently, and one woman had been sexually abstinent for the entire period. All five male sex partners remained HIV-anti-body negative. One of the women, knowing her HIV status, decided to postpone pregnancy."The index patient who had infected all of these women ceased having sex.The chief American strategies for preventing AIDS have been to target risk groups and/or to issue blanket warnings that tend to be ignored by people who do not perceive themselves to be at risk. Education is necessary, but is it as effective as direct contact tracing? None of the people in Belgium believed they were at risk; none knew that they could infect someone else. Once armed with the knowledge that they had the virus, they could make real decisions, moral decisions. And they could avail themselves of current treatments that postpone the fatal consequences of AIDS.In America, opponents of contact tracing argue that it is an invasion of privacy. The Belgian story, with its quiet, compassionate counseling of victims, offers important lessons.Which makes you wonder - what 'exactly' were they doing during last year's swine flu hoax when they had these computers chronicling the spread of H1N1 and you had all these sites that were tracking the epidemic in real-time?Lastly, here is a related article that draws up a connection between 'contact tracing' and 'social networks' (because it's one and the same, really) - I haven't read it yet in full.http://biocircuits.ucsd.edu/lev/papers/contact_tracing.pdfMORE PROOF:Excerpt from:https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.10.1.87Reporting, Contact Tracing, And ConfidentialityThe erosion of the alliance that had resisted the application of traditional public health practices to AIDS can be seen also in the shifting trends on the issue of reporting the names of those infected with HIV to confidential public health department registries. Gay groups and their allies had fiercely resisted such reporting requirements because of concerns about privacy and confidentiality. Public health officials in areas with large numbers of AIDS cases also opposed reporting because it might leave people less willing to seek voluntary HIV testing and counseling. As a consequence, reporting requirements had become policy in only a few states. By the late 1980s, fissures had begun to appear in the alliance opposing named reporting in those states where the prevalence of HIV infection was high and where gay communities were well organized.In June 1989, Stephen Joseph, then commissioner of health in New York City, told the Fifth International Conference on AIDS in Montreal that the prospect of early clinical intervention necessitated “a shift toward a disease control approach to HIV infection along the lines of classic tuberculosis practices.” 4 Central to such an approach would be the “reporting of seropositives” to assure effective clinical follow-up and “more aggressive contact tracing.” Joseph's proposals opened a debate that was only temporarily settled by the defeat of New York's Mayor Edward Koch in his 1989 bid for reelection. When newly elected Mayor David Dinkins selected Woodrow Myers, formerly commissioner of health in Indiana, to replace Joseph, his appointment was almost aborted, in part because he had supported named reporting. 5 The festering debate was ended only by a political decision on the part of the mayor, who had drawn heavily on support within the gay community, to stand by his appoint-ment while promising that there would be no named reporting.In New Jersey, which shares with New York City a relatively high level of HIV infection, the commissioner of health also supported named reporting, but the politics surrounding the issue were very different. There, both houses of the state legislature endorsed without dissent a confidentiality statute that included named reporting of cases of HIV infection. 6 New Jersey simply exemplified a national trend. For, although at the end of 1989 only nine states required named reporting without any provision for anonymity, states increasingly were adopting policies that required reporting in at least some circumstances. 7 And always the arguments were the same. New therapeutic possibilities provided the warrant for reestablishing a standard of traditional public health practice.Ironically, pressure to extend the provision of Medicaid coverage for early treatment and to expand government-funded clinics to treat those with HIV infection will inevitably result in the creation of records on growing numbers of infected individuals, regardless of whether states adopt mandatory reporting requirements. The move toward early clinical intervention then is incompatible with the preservation of anonymity. As a result, creating and enforcing regimes to protect the rights of infected persons from acts of discrimination will become even more important than in the epidemic's first years. In this context, not only state-level protections for individuals with HIV infection will be crucial. More important will be the implementation and enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act, legislation that explicitly includes those with HIV infection among the protected class covered by the enactment.The move toward named reporting was linked only in part to the argument that state health departments needed the names of individuals to assure adequate clinical follow-up. Public health officials also asserted that effective contact tracing, now more critical than ever because of the need for early clinical intervention, could be undertaken only if those with HIV infection, but who were not yet diagnosed as having AIDS, could be interviewed. Despite its central and well-established role in venereal disease control, the notification of sexual and needle-sharing partners in the context of AIDS had been a source of ongoing conflict between gay groups and civil liberties organizations on the one hand, and public health officials who had proposed such a strategy in the early years of the epidemic on the other. This notification was always predicated on the willingness of those with sexually transmitted diseases to provide public health workers with the names of their partners in exchange for a promise of anonymity. A standard disease control measure, it had been viewed by AIDS activists as a threat to confidentiality and as a potentially coercive intervention. Indeed, opponents of contact tracing typically denounced it as “mandatory.”With time and a better understanding of how contact tracing functioned in the context of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), some of the most vocal opponents of tracing yielded their principled opposition at least in private meetings and discussions and instead centered their concerns on the cost of so labor-intensive an intervention. Nevertheless, support for voluntary contact tracing was ultimately to come from the Institute of Medicine and the National Academy of Sciences, the Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic, the American Bar Association, and the American Medical Association (AMA). 8 Indeed, it was the AMA's support for tracing, justified by then executive vice-president James Sammons as having “the potential in the heterosexual society to substantially reduce the proliferation and spread of AIDS,” that provided the grounds for the group's support for mandatory HIV reporting. 9The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has been most active in pressing for the adoption of contact tracing programs at the state level, where all such programs are organized and funded. 10 Critically involved in the training of STD workers and in the funding of local venereal disease programs, CDC had from the outset urged the adoption of this standard public health approach to AIDS and HIV infection. In February 1988, the federal agency took on a more aggressive posture, making the adoption of partner notification by the states a condition for the receipt of funds from its HIV Prevention Program. 11 Despite such pressure, the response on the part of the states has been variable. States most heavily burdened by AIDS have continued to favor programs that encourage infected individuals to notify their own partners. Of the states that stressed the role of professional public health workers—the “provider referral” model—most have tended to have relatively modest AIDS case counts. 12 Thus, local epidemiological factors as well as political forces have continued to influence the course of public health policy.In part, both the early and the lingering resistance to partner notification can be explained by the confusion of the standard public health approach to STD control with policies and practices that are rooted in a very different tradition, entailing a “duty to warn” or protect those who might be threatened by individuals with communicable conditions. When such warnings have been deemed appropriate and legal, they have occurred without the consent of the index case and typically have involved the revelation of the identity of the threatening party.The early and strict confidentiality rules surrounding HIV screening and medical records in many states all but precluded physicians from warning individuals placed at risk by their sexual and needle-sharing partners. In recent years, the recognition that such limitations placed physicians in a position that sometimes violated professional ethical norms, the realization that some patients could pose a grave threat to unsuspecting partners, and the increasing importance of early therapeutic intervention have led to modifications of early confidentiality restrictions. Such modifications were often opposed on principled grounds by those who believed that physician/patient communications should never be violated and by those who argued that such breaches of confidentiality would have the counterproductive consequence of reducing patient candor, thus limiting the capacity of clinicians to effectively counsel and persuade individuals who might harm their partners. Yet they have been given strong support in a number of state legislatures and by the AMA and the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials. 13 As of 1990, no state had imposed upon physicians a duty to warn unsuspecting partners. But about a dozen had adopted legislation granting physicians a “privilege to warn or inform,” thus freeing physicians from liability for either warning or not warning those at risk. 14The question of how to respond to individuals whose behavior represented a threat to unknowing partners inevitably provoked continued discussion of the public health tradition of imposing restrictions on liberty in the name of communal welfare. Although all efforts to bring AIDS within the scope of state quarantine statutes have been fiercely opposed, more than twenty states did so between 1987 and 1990. 15 States typically used the occasion to modernize their disease control laws to reflect contemporary constitutional standards that detail procedural guarantees, and to require that restrictions on freedom represent the “least restrictive alternative” available to achieve a “compelling state interest.”With the exception of the few notable cases that have received press attention, there is no well-documented review of the extent to which newly revised quarantine statutes have been applied to the AIDS epidemic. There are, however, data to suggest that the power vested in public health officials by such laws has been used more often to warn than to incarcerate those whose behavior has posed a risk of HIV transmission. But, in any case, the numbers have been small. It is clear, therefore, that the enactment of revised quarantine laws has been responsive to political pressures and the belief in the efficacy of symbolic bulwarks.The enactment of statutes criminalizing behavior linked to the spread of AIDS has paralleled political receptivity to laws extending the authority of public health officials to control individuals whose behavior posed a risk of HIV transmission. Such use of the criminal law, broadly endorsed by the Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic in 1988, called upon a tradition of state enactments that made the knowing transmission of venereal disease a crime. 16 Though they almost never were enforced, these older laws served as a rationale for new legislative initiatives. Between 1987 and 1989, twenty states enacted such statutes, most of which defined the proscribed acts as felonies, despite the fact that older statutes typically treated knowing transmission as a misdemeanor. 17 Recent congressional action to increase federal support for local AIDS initiatives has conditioned the receipt of funds on the existence of state authority to prosecute individuals who knowingly expose unsuspecting persons to HIV. 18 As important, aggressive prosecutors have relied on laws defining assaultive behavior and attempted murder to bring indictments, even in the absence of AIDS-specific legislation.Any effort to determine to what extent prosecutions of HIV-related acts have occurred must confront the difficulty of monitoring the activity of local courts when there is neither a guilty verdict nor an appeal to a higher state tribunal. One survey, relying on newspaper accounts as well as official court reports, estimated that 50-100 prosecutions had been initiated involving acts as diverse as spitting, biting, blood splattering, blood donation, and sexual intercourse with an unsuspecting partner. 19 Though small in number, these cases have drawn great attention. In many cases, prosecution has been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, punishment for some of those found guilty has been unusually harsh.Last Edit by Gladstone
