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Philippines - Dec 8 1941
« on: Dec 08, 2019, 10:57:37 am »
 

tahoeblue

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https://kahimyang.com/kauswagan/articles/800/today-in-philippine-history-december-8-1941-japan-launched-a-surprise-attack-on-the-philippines
Today in Philippine History, December 8, 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Philippines

On December 8, 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Philippines, just ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Initial aerial bombardment was followed by landings of ground troops both north and south of Manila.

 The defending Philippine and United States troops were under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, who had been recalled to active duty in the United States Army earlier in the year and was designated commander of the United States Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The aircraft of his command were destroyed; the naval forces were ordered to leave; and because of the circumstances in the Pacific region, reinforcement and resupply of his ground forces were impossible.

Under the pressure of superior numbers, the defending forces withdrew to the Bataan Peninsula and to the island of Corregidor at the entrance to Manila Bay. Manila, declared an open city to prevent its destruction, was occupied by the Japanese on January 2, 1942.

The Philippine defense continued until the final surrender of United States-Philippine forces on the Bataan Peninsula in April 1942 and on Corregidor in May. Most of the 80,000 prisoners of war captured by the Japanese at Bataan were forced to undertake the infamous "Death March" to a prison camp 105 kilometers to the north. It is estimated that as many as 10,000 men, weakened by disease and malnutrition and treated harshly by their captors, died before reaching their destination. Quezon and Osmeña had accompanied the troops to Corregidor and later left for the United States, where they set up a government in exile. MacArthur was ordered to Australia, where he started to plan for a return to the Philippines.


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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines_campaign_(1941%E2%80%931942)

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The Japanese launched the invasion by sea from Formosa over 200 miles (320 km) to the north of the Philippines. The defending forces outnumbered the Japanese by 3 to 2, however they were a mixed force of non-combat experienced regular, national guard, constabulary and newly created Commonwealth units. The Japanese used first-line troops at the outset of the campaign, and concentrating their forces enabled a swift overrun of most of Luzon during the first month.

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The USAFFE's aviation arm was the Far East Air Force (FEAF) of the U.S. Army Air Forces, commanded by Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. Previously the Philippine Department Air Force and Air Force USAFFE, the air force was activated on 16 November 1941 and was the largest USAAF combat air organization outside the United States. Its primary combat power in December 1941 consisted of 91 serviceable P-40 Warhawk fighters and 34 B-17 Flying Fortress bombers, with further modern aircraft en route. Tactically the FEAF was part of the Reserve Force, so that it fell under MacArthur's direct command.

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News reached the Philippines that an attack on Pearl Harbor was in progress at 2:20 am local time on 8 December 1941.[32][33] FEAF interceptors had already conducted an air search for incoming aircraft reported shortly after midnight, but these had been Japanese scout planes reporting weather conditions.[34][35] At 3:30 am, Brigadier General Richard Sutherland, chief of staff to General Douglas MacArthur heard about the attack from a commercial radio broadcast.[32]At 5:00 am FEAF commander Gen. Brereton reported to USAFFE headquarters where he attempted to see MacArthur without success. He recommended to MacArthur's chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Richard Sutherland, that FEAF launch bombing missions against Formosa in accordance with Rainbow 5 war plan directives from which an attack was likely to come. Gen. Breteron was further made aware of an attack against the USS William B. Preston at Davao Bay.[36] Authorization was withheld, but shortly afterward, in response to a telegram from General George C. Marshall instructing MacArthur to implement Rainbow 5, Brereton was ordered to have a strike in readiness for later approval.[35][37]
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At 08:00 am, Brereton received a telephone call from Gen. Henry H. Arnold warning him not to allow his aircraft to be attacked while still on the ground. FEAF launched three squadron-sized fighter patrols and all of its serviceable bombers on Luzon between 08:00 and 08:30 am as a precautionary move.[38] After MacArthur gave Brereton the authorization he sought at 10:15 am, the bombers were ordered to land and prepare for the afternoon raid on Formosa. All three pursuit squadrons began to run short on fuel and broke off their patrols at the same time.

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Even though tracked by radar and with three U.S. pursuit squadrons in the air, when Japanese bombers of the 11th Kōkūkantai attacked Clark Field at 12:40 pm,[43] they achieved tactical surprise.

Two squadrons of B-17s were dispersed on the ground.

Most of the P-40s of the 20th PS were preparing to taxi and were struck by the first wave of 27 Japanese twin-engine Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers; only four of the 20th PS P-40Bs managed to take off as the bombs were falling.
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A near-simultaneous attack on the auxiliary field at Iba to the northwest by 54 "Betty" bombers was also successful: all but four of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron's P-40s, short on fuel and caught in their landing pattern, were destroyed in combat or from lack of fuel.[45] Twelve P-40s from the 20th (four), 21st (two), and 3rd (six) Squadrons attacked the strafers but with little success, losing at least four of their own.

The Far East Air Force lost fully half its planes in the 45-minute attack, and was all but destroyed over the next few days, including a number of the surviving B-17s lost to takeoff crashes of other planes
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That night FEAF combat strength had been reduced to 12 operable B-17s, 22 P-40s, and 8 P-35s.
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Clark Field was abandoned as a bomber field on 11 December after being used as a staging base for a handful of B-17 missions.[48] Between 17 and 20 December, the 14 surviving B-17s were withdrawn to Australia.

Every other aircraft of the FEAF was destroyed or captured.
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No formal investigation took place regarding this failure as occurred in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. After the war, Brereton and Sutherland in effect blamed each other for FEAF being surprised on the ground, and MacArthur released a statement claiming that he had no knowledge of any recommendation to attack Formosa with B-17
 

Re: Philippines - Dec 8 1941
« Reply #1 on: Dec 08, 2019, 03:15:09 pm »
 

tahoeblue

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZyvtabQjRrc
Carole Landis Lloyd Nolan Bombed ~ Manila Calling Scene

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOl5YpFVGYU
How To Start The B-17 Engine

https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/activating-rainbow-5-and-indigo-3/
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Despite their tense and awkward relationship, throughout the war Marshall was scrupulous in providing MacArthur with all the support he could. In memoranda to the president and to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Harold Stark, Marshall itemized a shopping list of men and matériel being shipped to the Philippines from August through December 1941. It included everything from tanks, troops, artillery, and anti-aircraft artillery to about 130 fighters, most of them P-40s, and more than 70 modern B-17 Flying Fortresses.

https://www.pacificwar.org.au/Philippines/USpreps.html
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Even though the Philippines was regarded as a likely primary target in the event of war with Japan, MacArthur took no significant steps to place his command on war alert. As he was preparing to depart on another frivolous overseas liaison mission for MacArthur, General Brereton warned his commander that the B-17 bombers at Clark Field near Manila were within range of Japanese bombers from Formosa (now Taiwan). Brereton proposed that the B-17s be moved to an airbase on the southern Philippine island of Mindaneo. [10] MacArthur agreed, but seventeen of his total force of thirty-five B-17s were still sitting on the airstrip at Clark Field when the Japanese attacked that airbase on 8 December 1941.

The failure of MacArthur and Brereton to pay proper heed to General Marshall's war warning of 27 November is demonstrated by the fact that neither man saw any need to cancel a lavish party held in the ballroom of MacArthur's hotel on the night of 7 December 1941 (Manila Time). Crewmen of the B-17s still sitting on the ground at Clark Field attended the party which lasted until 2.00 am on the morning of 8 December 1941.The revelling pilots were carrying orders to fly these vital aircraft to Mindaneo on the very day that the Japanese attacked. [11]

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harold_Rainsford_Stark

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Stark's most controversial service involved the growing menace of Japanese forces in the period before America was bombed into the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. The controversy centers on whether he and his Director of War Plans, Admiral Richmond K. Turner, provided sufficient information to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, about Japanese moves in the fall of 1941 to enable Kimmel to anticipate an attack and to take steps to counter it. Captain (later Rear Admiral) Edwin T. Layton was Kimmel's chief intelligence officer (later also Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's intelligence officer) at the time of the attack.

In his book, And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (1985), Layton maintained that Stark offered meaningless advice throughout the period, withheld vital information at the insistence of his Director of War Plans, Admiral Turner, showed timidity in dealing with the Japanese, and utterly failed to provide anything of use to Kimmel.[6]

John Costello (Layton's co-author), in Days of Infamy (Pocket, 1994), points out that Douglas MacArthur had complete access to both PURPLE and JN-25, with over eight hours warning, and was still caught by surprise.

Moreover, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers official historian Gordon Prange and his colleagues note in December 7, 1941 (McGraw-Hill, 1988), the defense of the fleet was General Walter C. Short's responsibility, not Kimmel's. Turner's insistence on having intelligence go through War Plans led Office of Naval Intelligence to a wrong belief that it was only to collect intelligence; Turner did not correct his view or aid Stark in understanding the problem.[7] Among others,[8] Morison and Layton agree that Turner was most responsible for the debacle, as does Ned Beach in Scapegoats (Annapolis, 1995).

In addition, there was considerable confusion over where Japan might strike, whether against the US, the Soviet Union, or British colonies in Asia and the Far East.[9]

https://www.nytimes.com/1972/08/21/archives/adm-harold-stark-dies-operations-chief-in-1941.html

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When Adm. Harold Raynsford Stark became Chief of Naval Operations in August, 1939, his main task was the creation of a “two‐ocean navy” to meet the threat of Germany and Japan.
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Three months after the attack he was superseded in the Navy's top command by the more aggressive Adm. Ernest J. King. There was little criticism of Admiral Stark at the time, however. He was decorated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and’ given command of United States naval forces in European waters, a post he held until the defeat of Germany in 1945. ...  the assignment was ambiguous, since the British exercised over‐all naval command in the area. Admiral Stark's tasks were primarily administrative. He was liaison between Washington and Whitehall.
 

 

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