I found this article and I think it's a great starting point. You have to read all though...The President's Broad Power to Pardon and Commute
July 9, 2007
The possibility of a President pardoning himself for a crime is not precluded by the explicit language of the Constitution, and, during the summer of 1974, some of President Richard M. Nixon's lawyers argued that it was constitutionally permissible. But a broader reading of the Constitution and the general principles of the traditions of United States law might lead to the conclusion that a self-pardon is constitutionally impermissible. It would seem to violate the principles that a man should not be a judge in his own case; that the rule of law is supreme and the United States is a nation of laws, not men; and that the President is not above the law.
Exactly what I called out President Trump on when he said to skip due process and "take the guns first." This guy is pushing to open a can of worms. Why should anyone care about the law if even the President/executive branch doesn't?
Suggestions for Further Research
David Gray Adler, The President's Pardon Power, in Inventing the American Presidency, Thomas E. Cronin, ed. (1989)
Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers (1940)
William Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 475 (1977)
Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me? The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 Yale L.J. 779 (1996)
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833)
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867)
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871)
Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927)
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974)
Well that's a good start I say. More to come.Last Edit by Humphrey
Constitution FOR the United States
Article I. Sec. 2. Clause 5
"The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."
Article I. Sec. 3. (The Senate) Clause 7
"Judgement in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."
Article II. Sec. 2. Clause 1
"The President ... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."
Article II. Sec. 4.
"The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
AAAAnd I just realized I missed looking up some terms when I went to the government today, so I'll have to come back to this later. :-\
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If they thought the next president after Trump would be president Hillary, perhaps that thought might clarify things.
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So I've concluded, after going back to read the government again (the government is in your local law library,) the constitution was not written for anyone so completely selfish enough to consider pardoning them-self. I rechecked the legal definitions I already had, and looked up the ones I missed the first time, and I don't think definitions can help in this topic. This should be decided in the Supreme Court. And I have to add, I personally wouldn't consider a personal pardon ethical.
The best information I could find supporting the original reasoning behind the presidential pardon was from The Federalist Papers, No. 74 (Hamilton) Tell me, this was supposed to be benevolent; was it not?
... He is also to be authorized to grant "reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body of men.
The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation to the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the legislative body. I shall not deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled at the immediate being of the society, when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the legislature. And this ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. But there are also strong objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever. It deserves particular attention, that treason will often be connected with seditions which embrace a large proportion of the community; as lately happened in Massachusetts. In every such case, we might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit which had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing itself of the good-nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. On the other hand, when the sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the resentments of the major party, they might often be found obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded a conduct of forbearance and clemency. But the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case to the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a welltimed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed, that a discretionary power, with a view to such contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the President, it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable, whether, in a limited Constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual course, would be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt.
As far as Blagovech goes (can't remember how his name is spelled at the moment), he was impeached. The constitution is plain and simple in this regard, the words used have no deeper legal meaning, and the man was impeached.
Trump should have never thought of giving that guy any leniency at all. Pure swamp creature.
Either way, keep in mind how this is being handled, because I promise you it'll come back to haunt us.Last Edit by Humphrey